the word “genocide” has become a litmus test for Democratic candidates, both in the 2026 election and looking ahead to 2028. It is now routine for candidates to be asked to raise their hand if they think Israel committed genocide.
No answer is without its costs. To answer “no” is a deal-breaker for progressives — “disqualifying,” in the words of online commentator Matt Bernstein. Yet to answer “yes” is disqualifying for many centrists. And to say “it’s complicated” — as potential presidential contender Gov. Andy Beshear of Kentucky and congressional candidate Scott Wiener of California have tried recently — doesn’t please anybody.
One of the first rules of politics is to appear firm and decisive, preferably leading individuals on each of the two sides of an issue to believe. Thoughtful and nuanced doesn't cut it. Yet, asked whether Israel's actions in Gaza constitute "genocide," Governor Beshear responded
That’s becoming one of those new litmus tests that we said we would never do as a party again. It’s trying to throw out a word and, “Are you going to raise your hand or are you not going to?” I understand that Israel was hit with a terrorist attack the likes of which it had never seen and it has been through a lot and that it deserves the right to defend itself and to eradicate that terrorist organization. I believe that it could have been done without a lot of the suffering, but I put a lot of that blame also on Donald Trump. If he’d said we are coming in and we are bringing food and aid and you are going to make sure that we’re safe, it wouldn't have happened.
Nonetheless, it has become a litmus test. And the beginning of the proper response is "No." That need not be an endorsement of the Netanyahu government, but an acknowledgement that the Arab/Muslim nations of the Mideast have failed the Palestinians. Israeli critic and Palestinian supporter Anmol Kumar explained a year ago that the "roots" of the "abandonment" of the Palestinian cause
trace back to the earliest days of the conflict. In 1948, when seven Arab states declared war against the nascent Israeli state, their decisive routing revealed not just military weakness but also the fundamental limitations of Arab state support for Palestine. The Nakba of 1948 shook the legitimacy of Arab regimes, creating a paradox where Arab states needed to appear supportive of the Palestinian cause while simultaneously fearing the consequences of genuine Palestinian empowerment.
The 1967 Six-Day War marked a crucial turning point, shattering any remaining illusions about Arab military solutions to the Palestinian question. The loss of the West Bank, East Jerusalem, Gaza Strip, Sinai Peninsula, and Golan Heights wasn’t merely a territorial defeat; it represented the beginning of a profound shift in Arab state attitudes toward the Palestinian cause. The war effectively ended dreams of conquering Israel through conventional military means and forced Arab states to confront their limitations in supporting Palestinian aspirations.
The United States skillfully exploited this moment of Arab weakness. Post-1967, American policy focused on what a State Department research memorandum termed the “de-Arabisation” of the Arabs – essentially, making them accept Western rationality, which included acquiescence to Israel’s regional dominance. This policy proved remarkably successful, as one Arab state after another fell into line with Washington’s vision for the region.
Egypt’s 1978 Camp David Accords with Israel under President Anwar Sadat represented the first major crack in Arab solidarity with Palestine. By signing a separate peace treaty with Israel that abandoned Palestinians to their fate under Israeli control, Egypt set a precedent for other Arab states to prioritize their bilateral interests over Palestinian rights. The transformation of Egypt’s powerful military from a force meant to confront Israel into one primarily focused on suppressing domestic democratic aspirations symbolized this shift perfectly.
When interviewed in February of 2024 by Politico, Ryan Crocker, who spent nearly four decades as a diplomat representing USA interests in the Arab world, stated of successive American administrations "I don't think we really understood how deep the chasm was between Arab rhetoric supporting the PLO and the fear and lathing behind the mask." He noted